Basic Principles for a New Japanese Constitution (FEC-031/19)

The attached is certified to be the official text of a document unanimously adopted at the eighteenth meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, held at 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C. on 2 July 1946.


Washington, D.C.
3 July 1946


1.The Japanese Constitution should recognize that sovereign power resides in the people. It should be so framed as to provide for:

a. A representative government based upon universal adult suffrage consisting of:

(1) An executive deriving its authority from and responsible to either the electorate or a fully representative legislative body;

(2) A legislature, fully representative of the electorate, which should have full legislative powers including full control over raising of public revenue and expenditure of public funds;

b. The establishment of an independent judiciary;

c. The guarantee of fundamental civil rights to all Japanese and to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction. All Japanese shall enjoy equal rights before the law and no special privileges of particular social groups such as the nobility shall be allowed;

d. The popular election of heads of institutions of local government such as prefectures, cities, towns and villages;

e. The popular election of local assemblies such as prefectural, city, town, and village.

f. The adoption of constitutional amendments in a manner which will give effect to the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

2. Though the ultimate form of government in Japan is to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, the retention of the Emperor Institution in its present constitutional form is not considered consistent with the foregoing general objectives. Consequently, the Japanese should be encouraged to abolish the Emperor Institution or to reform it along more democratic lines.

3. If the Japanese people decide that the Emperor Institution is not to be retained, constitutional safeguards against the institution will obviously not be required, but the constitution will have to conform to the requirements of paragraph 1 and shall also provide:

a. That the legislature shall have sole authority over financial measures and any other organ shall possess only a temporary veto power over other legislative measures;

b. That the prime minister and the ministers of state, all of whom shall be civilians and of whom a majority, including the prime minister, shall be selected from the Diet, shall form a Cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature. If a system of government is adopted whereby the chief executive is elected to that office by the people, the provision that a majority of the Cabinet members shall be chosen from the legislature should not necessarily apply;

c. That the legislative organ shall have the power to meet at will.

4. If the Japanese decide to retain the Institution of the Emperor, the following safeguards in addition to those enumerated in 1 and 3 above will be necessary:

a. When a Cabinet loses the confidence of the legislature it shall either resign or appeal to the electorate;

b. The Emperor shall have no powers other than those to be conferred on him by the new Constitution. He shall act in all cases in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet;

c. The Emperor shall be deprived of all military authority such as that provided in Articles XI, XII, XIII, and XIV of Chapter 1 of the Constitution of 1889;

d. All property of the Imperial household shall be declared property of the State. The expenses of the Imperial household shall be appropriated by the legislature.

5. The retention of the Privy Council and the House of Peers in their present form and with their present powers is not considered consistent with the foregoing general objectives.