Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan (SWNCC150)

TOP SECRET
SWNCC 150
11 June 1945
Pages 1 to 8, Incl.


STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-DEFEAT POLICY RELATING TO JAPAN
References: a. SWNCC 16/4.
b. SWNCC 54.

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this paper has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the request for an expression of their views from a military point of view. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be circulated for consideration by the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

ENCLOSURE

POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-DEFEAT POLICY RELATING TO JAPAN

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM
1. To determine the initial post-defeat policy of the United States relating to Japan.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department requested on 6 April 1945 "that the Department of State furnish the Civil Affairs Division with a short policy statement with respect to the treatment of Japan, which statement should have the Presidential approval to the end that civil affairs planning for Japan may proceed." "We have in mind a statement for Japan similar to the statement as approved by the President with respect to the treatment of Germany."

3. SWNCC 54 requests the Department of State to prepare a paper on the subject "Basic Policies and Objectives of the United States in the Pacific and the Far East", which appears as Item I in SWNCC 16/4.

4. In accordance with these requests, the Department of State expressed its views on the above subject. The State Department paper has been considered and used by the Subcommittee for the Far East in the preparation of this report.

CONCLUSIONS
5. It is concluded that the Appendix should be accepted as a statement of the United States initial post-defeat policy relating to Japan.

RECOMMENDATIONS
6. It is recommended that:
a. This report be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a request for an expression of their views from the military point of view;
b. The statements of policy contained in the Appendix be approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the State, War and Navy Departments for their guidance.

[Annex]
SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-DEFEAT POLICY RELATING TO JAPAN

A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
I. OBJECTIVES
The general objectives of the United States in regard to Japan are:
1. The unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan;
2. The stripping from the Japanese Empire of territories, including the Mandated Islands, in harmony with the Cairo Declaration and such other pertinent agreements as may be reached by the United Nations, and to which the United States is a party;
3. The creation of conditions which will insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world;
4. The eventual emergence of a government in Japan which will respect the rights of other states and Japan's international obligations; and
5. The eventual participation of Japan in a world economic system on a reasonable basis.

II. UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OR TOTAL DEFEAT
Immediately upon the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan, the supreme allied commander will exercise supreme authority over the domestic and foreign affairs of the Japanese Empire. Simultaneously, the constitutional powers of the Emperor shall be suspended. All instrumentalities which participate in the formulation or consideration of national policies shall be suspended, pending the achievement of the objectives of military government, and their functions shall be assumed by military government.

B. POLITICAL
I. SUCCESSIVE PERIODS IN THE TREATMENT OF JAPAN
In order to achieve these general objectives the policies of the United States should be considered separately for three successive periods of Japan's post-war development.
The first of these periods will be that during which the terms to be imposed on Japan as a result of its surrender or its total defeat will be enforced by military occupation. In this period the Japanese will undergo stern discipline, as they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.
The second period will be one of close surveillance; restrictions will be progressively relaxed as Japan demonstrates its willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations. Military government might be replaced by some other supervisory agency.
The third period will be one which will look toward the ultimate aim of the United States, namely, a Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of peaceful nations.
The duration of the occupation and the treatment of the Japanese throughout the three periods will depend in large measure on the behaviour of the Japanese.

II. THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
The immediate objective of military government in Japan shall be the strict enforcement of the terms imposed upon Japan. Within such frame work, the general political objectives of the military government are:
1. The abolition of militarism;
2. The strengthening of democratic tendencies and processes;
3. The encouragement of liberal political elements and the creation of conditions in Japan which will facilitate the emergence of a government with which the United Nations can deal.

III. MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OCCUPATION
1. Security
Japan's ground, air and naval forces are to be disarmed and disbanded; military and naval materiel, vessels and installations are to be surrendered or destroyed; industries primarily military in character are to be eliminated. All measures taken in this connection shall be designed to accomplish to the extent possible the permanent disarmament and demilitarization of Japan.
2. Character of Military Government
The measures of military government should be stern but just.
3. Administrative Functions and Machinery
Military government should utilize the Japanese administrative machinery and, so far as practicable, Japanese public officials, making these officials responsible for the carrying out of the policies and directives of the military government. Military government should in no circumstances allow persons to hold public office or any other position of responsibility or influence in public or private enterprise, who have been flagrant exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. The administration of affairs in Japan should be directed toward the development of local responsibility.
4. Some of the Initial Tasks of Military Government
Among the important tasks to be early undertaken by military government are:
(1) Nullification of Obnoxious Laws
Laws, ordinances and regulations which conflict with the purposes and policies of the military government shall be suspended or repealed. Agencies charged specifically with the execution of such laws, ordinances and regulations shall be abolished or appropriately modified.
(2) Political Parties or Agencies
Existing political parties, including totalitarian, political and quasi-political organizations and ultra-nationalistic societies, shall be dissolved.
(3) Freedom of Worship
Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation.
(4) Media of Public Information
The military government will aim to terminate the dissemination of ideas subversive of the purposes of the United Nations, and to substitute therefor information and knowledge of the ideals and concepts in which the United Nations believe.
(5) The Educational System
Control shall be established over the educational system for the purpose of eliminating Japanese militarism and ultranationalism, including para-military training, and making possible the development of democratic ideas.
(6) The Administration of Justice
The military government shall supervise the administration of justice, and, so far as practicable, the civil courts will continue to function as an instrumentality of military government. All persons unjustly or illegally held in custody shall be released.
(7) War Criminals and Other Dangerous Persons
War Criminals shall be arrested, brought to trial and punished. Japanese leaders and other persons who have been flagrant exponents of militant nationalism and aggression and any other persons manifesting open hostility to the objectives of military government shall be arrested and interned.

C. ECONOMIC
I. DEMILITARIZATION
Military government shall enforce a program to demilitarize industry with the aim of preventing Japan from again developing an economic war potential. There shall be developed and established a system of controls that can be continued after occupation has ceased and which will assure the continued economic disarmament of Japan over a longer period. Japan shall be permitted to retain no specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war or aircraft of any type and shall be deprived of the heavy industry capacity in excess of normal peacetime requirements and those key industries upon which an extensive war industry could be redeveloped. Pending decision on disposition either by transfer abroad, use in Japan or scrapping, there should be no destruction of facilities readily convertible to civilian production except in emergency situations.

II. CONTROL OF JAPANESE ECONOMY
In order to meet the needs of the occupation forces and to prevent starvation and such disease and civil unrest as would interfere with the operations of military government, military government shall take such steps as may be necessary with respect to (a) essential national public services; (b) finance and banking; (c) production and distribution of essential commodities; and (d) exports and imports. No steps shall be taken by the military government which would raise the standard of living of the Japanese people to a standard out of line with that of neighboring peoples.

III. REPARATIONS, RESTITUTION AND RELIEF
In accordance with decisions by the appropriate authorities, military government shall arrange for relief to the United Nations and to liberated areas, for restitution of identifiable looted property and for reparations. The first charge on the proceeds of all approved exports, for reparations or otherwise, shall be a sum necessary to pay for approved imports. Reparations or relief for liberated areas shall not constitute a ground for the restoration or development of Japanese industries which might contribute to the rearmament of Japan or whose expansion might promote dependence by other countries on Japan for strategic products.

IV. PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES
Military government shall encourage the development of democratic organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, and shall favor a wider distribution of ownership, management and control of the Japanese economic system.

V. CONTROL OF FOREIGN ASSETS AND CREDIT
No credit shall be extended Japan or any Japanese person by foreign persons or governments, except with approval of military government. Military government shall hold for subsequent disposition title to all foreign assets of the Japanese government, of Japanese citizens and of Japanese corporations domiciled in the main islands. No Japanese person shall be permitted to acquire foreign assets except by specific approval of the military government.

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